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Abstract
Recently a lot of different institutions and research 
centers around the world gradually launch their corporate 
governance assessment system, making each interested 
party to get to know the corporate governance level 
and making reasonable decisions. This essay is based 
upon corporate governance and assessment connotation, 
summarizes and concludes the research progress of 
domestic and overseas corporate governance quantitative 
assessment ,  f inding that  corporate  governance 
quantitative assessment mainly relies on composite 
indicator assessment, but there is still big difference 
in the starting point, targeted object and assessment 
indicator of assessment indicator system, so some people 
question the validity and applicability of this assessment 
indicator system. Based on this, this essay points out that 
the existent literature review has some problems such 
as assessment subject is vague, missing out some key 
indicators, weighting subjectively and failing to abide 
the principle of “ substance over form”, thus bringing up 
corresponding suggestion.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of domestic and foreign 
companies have been frequently exposed corporate 
scandals, which make corporate governance issues 
continuously attract community-wide attention and 
research. When making investment decisions, investors 
are no longer confined to the financial statements analysis, 
and corporate governance level has become one of the 
key factors that investors examine in making investment 
decisions. A series of surveys made by McKinsey & 
Company targeted at individual and institutional investors 
showed that most investors were willing to pay a higher 
premium for companies with sound corporate governance 
(Newell & Wilson, 2002). Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2004) found in the study that the corporate governance 
level was closely associated with growth of investment 
opportunities, ownership concentration, external financing 
needs and protection of investors’ rights. Multiple angles 
have verified that it is of great practical significance to 
conduct research on the evaluation system of corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is related to the 
fields of investors’ decision-making, corporate earnings 
management, corporate performance, corporate finance 
and corporate social responsibility, even to the survival 
and development of the corporation. Documents in these 
areas widely employ researches on quantitative evaluation 
system of corporate governance. However, we find that 
the existing index systems of corporate governance 
evaluation systems at home and abroad have different 
evaluation contents. Some indicators can not effectively 
reflect the real situation of corporate governance, and 
some key indicators are omitted, which causes the 
application error. Some scholars have misunderstandings 
of corporate governance connotation and neglect 
stakeholder evaluation, resulting in a lack of necessary 
integrity of corporate governance evaluation. Therefore, 
starting from the connotation of corporate governance, 
this thesis summarizes existing research progress, points 
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out the existing problems in the evaluation system 
of corporate governance and puts forward improving 
recommendations.
1. CONNOTATION AND EVALUATION 
C O N C E P T  O F  C O R P O R A T E 
GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance issues in the modern sense arise 
from the separation of ownership and management right, 
as well as the resulting agency relationship. Theory 
circle began to focus on corporate governance issues 
from the study of Berle and Means (1932), but until the 
1980s, after corporate governance was proposed as a 
concept, it got people’s wide attention and emphasis. So 
far, the academic circle has still remained differences 
and debate in understanding of corporate governance 
connotation.
At present, two common views exist at home and 
abroad: The first view is taking shareholders as the core of 
corporate governance,which was held by representatives 
including Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Shleifer and Vishny, (1997), and Tirole (2001).
The view is that business owners (usually shareholders) 
invest physical capital to form corporate property. They 
bear the residual risk of corporate, so the core of corporate 
governance is to protect the interests of shareholders and it 
should follow the principle of supremacy of shareholders’ 
rights and interests. The biggest advantage of this view 
is that the interests of business owners are protected, and 
such unilateral governance model also help to improve 
the efficiency of decision-making. However, shareholders 
are only the initial capital investment people, while the 
value added generated in the process of production and 
operation also depends on joint participation such as staff 
and operators, who also bear the associated risks. The 
blind pursuit of maximizing shareholders’ interests may 
also lead to companies ignoring to shoulder their social 
responsibility, which is not conducive to their long-term 
development. Therefore, neglect of human capital as 
well as interests of other stakeholders makes this view be 
widely disputed.
The other view is the governance of stakeholders, 
which were held by representatives including Freeman( 
1984), Cochran and Wartick (1988), Blair (1995), 
Yang (1998) and Li (2001). The view is that corporate 
governance should put stakeholders at the same position 
with shareholders, whose core is that multi parties jointly 
participate in the governance. Capital and labor required 
for companies’ operations take the whole society as 
their acquisition room, and their products and services 
in turn are needed by the whole society. This nature 
determines that companies, from start-up to operations, 
should take the safeguard of multi-party interests such 
as all investors, employees and consumers as the starting 
point and the code of conduct. The advantage of this 
view is that the interests of other stakeholders in addition 
to the owner are taken into account, and also including 
due social responsibility of companies. This view holds 
that companies’ residual control rights should be jointly 
assumed by multi-party and corporate governance is 
a multi-participatory governance, which is conducive 
to long-term survival and development of companies. 
However, the biggest flaw of this view is the definition 
of stakeholders. Therefore, if the range of stakeholders 
can be better divided, this view should be relatively ideal 
corporate governance model.
It can be seen that stakeholder governance view is 
more in line with social development and stability, so 
it is accepted by most scholars as well as this thesis. 
Therefore, we believe that corporate governance is a 
process jointly participated by multi-party. Through 
a series of combinations of internal and external 
institutional arrangements and reasonable governance 
structure setting, it is possible to achieve the balance of 
rights, responsibilities and interests of major stakeholders, 
thereby improving companies’ decision-making capacity 
and efficiency, enhancing their capacity for sustainable 
development, maintaining the common interests of all 
stakeholders, and ultimately maximizing the interests of 
companies. Accordingly, the connotation of corporate 
governance evaluation takes the connotation of corporate 
governance as the core, and the principles of corporate 
governance as evaluation guidelines. In the evaluation 
process of corporate governance, objective and fair 
evaluation should be made according to rationality of 
corporate governance structure, compliance of corporate 
operations, fulfillment of responsibilities by all levels of 
stakeholders, interests safeguard of major stakeholders, 
timeliness and completeness of information disclosure 
as well as the achievement of the objectives of corporate 
governance.
2 .  R E S E A R C H  P R O G R E S S  O F 
C O R P O R A T E  G O V E R N A N C E ’ S 
QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
2.1 Foreign Research
The earlier formal specification research abroad on 
quantitative evaluation of corporate governance was the 
first set of formal evaluation procedures of the Board 
designed in 1952 by American Institutional Investors 
Association. Early launch of corporate governance’s 
quantitative evaluation mostly targeted at unilateral 
governance or a single aspect to conduct evaluation, 
failing to form a relatively complete system. The first 
corporate governance evaluation system abroad was 
corporate governance service system of US Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) (1998). After modification, it introduced 
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corporate governance evaluation (scoring) system 
(2004)for global listed companies, and actually carried 
out applications. Since then, the European Deminor 
company (Deminor) (1999) had developed a European 
corporate governance rating services, whose introduction 
was a major breakthrough in the area of corporate 
governance, providing investors with a benchmark in 
the investment decision-making.Meanwhile, the rating 
agency also represented corporate clients. Making 
advantage of scorecards and relevant methods draws 
up “corporate governance profile” in detail which was 
regarded as disclosed “corporate governance evaluation 
and investors report”. CLSA Asia (2000) also introduced 
corporate governance evaluation system for global 
companies. In addition, Japan Corporate Governance 
Institute introduced company-level corporate governance 
evaluation index system (JCGIndex) and so on. These 
are typical evaluation systems of corporate governance 
worldwide.  Main index const i tu t ion is  seen in 
Table 1.
Table 1 
The Systems of Representative Corporate Governance Evaluation at Home and Abroad and Their Features
The 
organization 
or individual 
of corporate 
governance 
evaluation
Evaluation 
level First grade index setting Features
Standard 
& Poor’s 
（S&P）
Country 
level
 Legal basis, market basis, information disclosure 
regulations, and supervision This evaluation system is a corporate governance 
evaluation standard for global companies, but it 
just concerns the financial stakeholders, so it is not 
comprehensive. 
Corporate 
level
Ownership structure, the rights and inter relationship 
among the financial stakeholders, the structure and 
operation procedure of the board of directors, the 
financial transparency and information disclosure. 
Deminor
Country 
scoring The law analysis of corporate governance This evaluation system heads for organization 
investors’ interests, and more concerns the impact 
of corporate governance environment on corporate 
governance level rather than evaluations of 
corporate social responsibility stakeholders, etc. 
Corporate 
scoring
The rights and obligations of the stockholders, the scale 
of taking over and defense. The structure and function 
of the board of directors, and the corporate governance 
disclosure. 
Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia
（CLSA） 
CLSA
Scoring of 
countries 
and regions
Corporate transparency, the political and regulatory 
environment that affects corporate governance and 
maximization of corporate value , comprehensive rules 
and supervision regulations as well as implementation of 
relevant laws and regulations, institutional mechanism 
of corporate governance culture, and the adoption of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices. 
This evaluation system is a global corporate 
governance evaluation system, focusing on 
evaluating governance of the board of directors. 
Meanwhile, it not only evaluates the protection 
for the interests of big stockholders, but also pays 
concerns evaluation of protection for minority 
stockholders and fairness. The unique advantage of 
this evaluation system is that it pays attention to the 
evaluation of corporate social responsibility ,which 
is rare among so many corporate governance 
evaluation systems.
Corporate 
scoring
Management constraints， protection or fairness for 
minority stockholders, transparency，the board of 
directors structure and independence, the responsibility 
of the board of directors, the accountability of the 
board of directors, cash rewards for stockholders, social 
responsibility of corporations. 
Japanese 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
( JCGIndex)
Corporate 
level
 Operator responsibility system, the function and 
composition of the board of directors, the experienced 
implementation of top manager system, communication 
between the stockholders and the transparency. 
This evaluation system is dominated by 
stockholders’ equity and makes evaluation from 
performance target, which complies with the 
stockholders’ interests. The disadvantage of this 
evaluation system is that the evaluation result can 
not reflect the other major stakeholders’ interests, 
and setting of the evaluation shall be improved.
China 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
(CCGINK)
Corporate 
level
Holding stockholder’s behavior，directors and the 
Board of Directors，the supervisors and the board of 
supervisors，managers，information disclosure and 
internal control system， stakeholders.
In this evaluation system, it regards the 
stakeholders as one index to evaluate. The setting 
of the evaluation content obtains universal 
approval, but it does not evaluate the security of 
staff’s or stakeholders’ interests.  
Research 
center of 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange
Corporate 
level
Stockholder’s behavior regulations, constraints 
and incentives of key person, stockholder’s right, 
transparency, the structure of the board of directors.
This evaluation system design for China’s listed 
corporations, without considering the external 
environment and macro factors of corporate 
governance due to mere consideration of single 
corporation.
To be continued
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In addition to the typical evaluation system launched 
by the above companies or institutions, the representative 
researches of foreign individual scholars are: Researches 
on the establishment of corporate governance quantitative 
evaluation system by Howard (2004), Strenger (2004), 
Lazarides and Drimpetas (2011), Zheng and Zhou (2012) 
and other scholars. Howard Sherman (2004) believed 
that the enterprise focusing on corporate governance and 
transparency would create higher returns and economic 
performance, and reduce capital costs over time. Based 
on the database consisting of related data of more 
than 4,100 companies, and with the global corporate 
governance standard released by the organization for 
economic cooperation and development (OECD) as the 
rating standard, Howard (2004) and his team evaluated 
the board accountability, financial information disclosure, 
shareholder rights, compensation policies, market control, 
shareholder base, corporate reputation and industrial 
relations, supervision measures, environmental behaviors 
and other aspects, identified 20 companies who got the 
highest scores in corporate governance, and established 
the Governance Metrics International GMI. Strenger 
(2004) systematically expounded. The German Scorecard 
on corporate governance, which had a standardized 
format and can be effectively applied to the corporate 
self-evaluation and comparison between industries. The 
main evaluation standards of the Scorecard include 7 
aspects, such as the promise of corporate governance, 
shareholders and general meetings of shareholders, 
cooperation between the management committee and 
the board of supervisors, the management committee, 
the board of supervisors, transparency, and the report 
and audit of annual financial statements. The advantages 
of the Scorecard lie in that it can be applied to improve 
the corporate governance and can be applied by the 
analysts and investors in practice. Its shortage is that it 
is not comprehensive enough in the evaluation. Through 
the analysis, Lazarides and Drimpetas (2011) found that 
the company scale, concentration of the leadership or 
authority and characteristics of director board are the main 
factors affecting the quality of corporate governance. 
Therefore, they used binary variables to construct the 
corporate governance quality evaluation index. At the 
same time, they used the annual reporting data to identify 
the mechanism and practice of corporate governance, 
and used the orderly probit model to identify the driver 
of corporate governance. The advantages of this index 
are that the index establishes the evaluation for these 
aspects by identifying the factors that generate impacts 
on the quality of corporate governance; therefore, through 
focusing on the index, decision makers can create a legal 
supervision framework which can improve the level of 
corporate governance. But its deficiencies lie in that data 
are obtained from the annual financial report, and the 
distortion of accounting information will directly affect 
the evaluation results, so the reliability of the information 
needs to be improved. Taking helping investors to make 
investment decisions as the purpose, Zheng and Zhou 
(2012) established the intelligent corporate governance 
analysis and rating system, ICGA with key factors in 
the related corporate governance documents released by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
including rules and regulations, codes of conduct, moral 
rules, information of director board, senior executive 
compensation system, and insider trading information as 
starting points of the corporate governance evaluation. 
The system can provide independent and reliable 
corporate governance information for government 
agencies, investors, securities analysts, accountants, 
financial institutions, etc.
Some scholars have studied its effectiveness and 
reliability by applying the existing corporate governance 
evaluation. Dallas and Patel (2004) and Annelies et al. 
(2010) believed that corporate governance rating should 
be actively provided, and there was no contractual 
relationship between corporate governance rating agencies 
and companies. Although the complexity of information 
makes it difficult to make accurate evaluation of corporate 
governance, corporate governance rating is still an 
effective index for evaluating the quality of corporate 
The 
organization 
or individual 
of corporate 
governance 
evaluation
Evaluation 
level First grade index setting Features
Hai Tong 
Securities 
Research 
Center
Corporate 
level
Equity structure, stockholders’ right, governance 
structure, match between governance and management, 
information disclosure of financial governance.
This evaluation system serves various corporate 
stakeholders mainly evaluating whether the 
corporation complies with the effective corporate 
governance standards, however , setting of the 
evaluation index is incomplete. 
Dapeng 
Securities Co., 
Ltd
Corporate 
level
Ownership structure and its influence, stockholder’s right, 
financial transparency and information disclosure, the 
structure and operation of the board of directors. 
This evaluation system is based on the corporate 
governance evaluation system promoted by 
Standard & Poor’s and Deminor focusing on 
governance of the board of directors, but the 
evaluation content is not complete enough.
Continued
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governance. However, not all results of corporate 
governance evaluation system can be trusted. Daryl 
Koehn and Ueng (2005) compared two kinds of typical 
corporate governance rating system, and carried out the 
empirical analysis: the data sources and composition 
of evaluation index system of Governance Metrics 
International (GMI) and in the United States institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) are not the same. The research 
results show that investors should not excessively rely 
on the corporate governance score that ISS provides, 
and there is no result showing that there is a positive 
correlation between the high corporate governance score 
and corporate governance in the profit of high quality. 
Klapper and Love (2004) used the latest data of corporate 
governance in 14 emerging market companies for 
analysis, and found that the corporate governance level 
was related with the degree of information asymmetry. 
The research results of Chhaochharia et al. (2008) showed 
that, in Europe, although the corporate governance was 
spontaneous to a large extent, corporate governance rating 
seemed to increase with time, thus improving the level of 
corporate governance to be closer to the needs of outside 
investors. This also raises the relevant discussion: whether 
the corporate governance should be regulated by the law, 
or decided by the “invisible hand” market. These findings 
provide help for the effectiveness of recent research to 
observe the good corporate governance guidelines.
  The quantitative evaluation of corporate governance 
and related research range in foreign countries are 
relatively wide, and many corporate governance 
researches apply the quantitative evaluation data 
of corporate governance. Therefore, the corporate 
governance evaluation quantitative research not only plays 
an important guiding role in the evaluation of corporate 
governance level, but also contributes to the related 
research fields of corporate governance.
2.2 Domestic Research
The domestic research on corporate governance 
evaluation is later than that of abroad. From the 
theoretical basis of corporate governance evaluation, Pei 
(2001) of China Eagle Securities Co., Ltd. analyzed the 
main foreign corporate governance evaluation system 
and Chinese corporate governance characteristics at the 
present stage in combination with the Chinese company 
governance environment, made some modification based 
on Deminor, Standard & Poor’s, and other more mature 
foreign corporate governance evaluation system, and 
put forward Chinese corporate governance evaluation 
system framework. The listed corporate governance 
evaluation project group of Haitong Securities Institute 
(2002) also launched the listed corporate governance 
evaluation system, and performed the actual application. 
The evaluation system was established based on the 
reality of the listed corporate governance in China and 
the relevant laws and regulations of China. The listed 
corporate governance index (CGI) that the evaluation 
system launched was mainly used in the situation that 
the company complies with the corporate governance 
standards, and provided service to all interest subjects 
of the enterprise. In China, the Corporate Governance 
Research Center of Nankai University launched 
earlier Chinese listed corporate governance evaluation 
system (2003), had launched Chinese Listed Corporate 
Governance Index (CCGINK) for many years, and 
was widely recognized and applied. The Research 
Department of the Shanghai Stock Exchange has been 
working in the field of corporate governance research, in 
2000 promulgated the Shanghai Stock Exchange Listed 
Corporate Governance Guidelines Consultation, and then, 
Hu and Danian (2002) further launched the Chinese listed 
corporate governance evaluation index system.
In addition to the above mentioned institutions 
and research centers’ researches on the establishment 
of corporate governance evaluation system, domestic 
individual scholars also performed the research 
individually. Based on the analysis of the problems 
existing in the corporate governance process of 
state-owned enterprises, He (2006) put forward the 
corporate governance evaluation system for state-
owned enterprises, and that the change of evaluation 
system involved four aspects including the governance 
structure, shareholder structure, rights of shareholders and 
information disclosure. On the basis of the domestic and 
international researches as well as the data availability 
and objectivity, Liang (2006) set up 20 specific indexes 
for corporate governance evaluation index system from 
the following six aspects: equity structure, the general 
meeting of stockholder and stockholder’s right, the 
board of directors, the board of supervisors, as well as 
information disclosure. Lu (2007) established a China’s 
listed corporate governance evaluation system from the 
following seven aspects: structure and operation factors 
of the board of directors, equity structure, the general 
meeting of stockholder and the stockholder’s right, 
the board of supervisors, incentive and constraint of 
senior management, stakeholders as well as corporate 
transparency. Meanwhile, she made use of Delphi method 
to determine the weight among indexes, and evaluates 
with scores. Liao and Zhai (2009) researched the listed 
corporate governance evaluation system based on the 
perspective of the protection for small and medium-sized 
investors. They established the first grade evaluation index 
from three aspects, equity structure, stockholder’s right, 
investors’ relations management. And, they set the second 
and third grade index specifically. With analytic hierarchy 
process, Yan (2010) established insurance corporate 
governance evaluation index system covering eight first 
grade indexes as well as related and specific indexes, 
the eight first grade indexes are the board of directors 
governance, the board of supervisors governance, 
mechanism of stockholders’ equity, manager governance, 
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mechanism of information disclosure, stakeholder 
governance, corporate governance culture, and corporate 
social responsibility. And he evaluated with scores.  
The above articles on corporate governance evaluation 
system are based on China’s corporate governance 
features and China’s related laws and regulations, such 
as, Listed Company Governance Guide，and Company 
Law. They all comply with China’s reality. But the 
content of the evaluation differs from each other, which 
is mainly caused by the different evaluation targets, 
different information users, different causes and different 
evaluation points of the evaluation systems. 
As the development of China’s corporate governance 
evaluation system, the researches on all the typical 
evaluation systems are going on. Niu and Li (2004) 
compared and analyzed the governance evaluation 
systems of major corporations at home and abroad, and 
then they had doubt on the adaptability, evaluation criteria, 
and evaluation content, thus they thought the corporate 
governance evaluation system may include evaluation on 
social responsibility. Zhou (2004) analyzed the principles 
and targets of corporate governance as well as the present 
corporate governance evaluation models, and then he 
thought that it could establish China’s listed corporate 
governance evaluation system from the three aspects, the 
corporate external governance evaluation, the corporate 
internal governance evaluation and the match between 
governance and management.
Zhang (2008) reviewed the practice of major corporate 
governance evaluation at home and abroad, then he 
reevaluate the corporate governance evaluation system 
at home and abroad. He thought that the evaluation 
content, value method, weight distribution and calculation 
principles of each corporate governance evaluation system 
were not the same, and the scope of application had its 
own focus. Comparing with the foreign evaluation, the 
domestic one concerns more on form rather than essence. 
Moreover, he pointed out that corporate governance 
evaluation should be “corporate governance evaluation 
on job performance”, and the evaluation system should 
make clear what to evaluate and who does it. In addition, 
he said it was necessary to encourage several kinds of 
commercial organizations to be evaluation subject in 
future. Meng and Zhang（2009）compared and analyzed 
the typical corporate governance evaluation system at 
home and abroad, and they thought that it should pay 
more attention to the evaluation to the stockholders’ 
behavior, independent director, and management incentive 
constraint mechanism when it comes to the evaluation of 
internal governance, meanwhile, it should pay attention 
to the evaluation of external governance. Li, Xu, and 
Song (2011) systematically combed the recent and related 
articles of corporate governance evaluation research 
in foreign companies as well as related and empirical 
researches based on corporate governance evaluation 
index. They proposed that the corporate governance 
environment should be included to design the corporate 
governance evaluation system, the evaluation object and 
content should be developed, and we should establish 
the corporate governance evaluation system that fits 
the transformed background in China. Meanwhile, they 
pointed out that we should consider the efficiency of 
corporate governance index and endogeneity of corporate 
governance when we applied the corporate governance 
index to do empirical research. Wu and Chen (2012) 
summed up the corporate governance researches at 
home and abroad based on the research background and 
connotation of corporate governance evaluation. They 
thought that the content of China’s corporate governance 
evaluation lacked pertinency, the evaluation subject was 
not clear, and we should pay attention to the quality of 
evaluation information and the equity structure. The 
representative corporate governance evaluation systems at 
home and abroad are as shown in table 1.
3. MAIN PROBLEMS IN QUANTITATIVE 
E VA L U AT I O N  O F  T H E  C U R R E N T 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
At present, there are few documents on the problems in 
the quantitative evaluation of the corporate governance 
at home and abroad. Few relative documents point out 
its problems mainly including the disunity of evaluation 
criterion, the lack of evaluation on social responsibilities, 
the poor feasibility of the criteria for corporate governance 
and evaluation, the low reliability of the evaluated 
information and so on. However, these discussions are 
not comprehensive and deep enough. They ignore some 
key problems. For example, the evaluation of the present 
evaluation system which lacks the evaluations on the 
effect of governance does not combine the external form 
and internal essence of corporate governance and so on.
a) The vagueness of evaluation subject causes the 
deviation in application. According to the relative 
documents, the original evaluation on corporate 
governance is just a one-way evaluation, which usually 
focuses on the function, structure and fulfillment of 
responsibilities of board of directors. This kind of 
evaluation usually holds the view that the essence of 
corporate governance is the governance of board of 
directors and the quality of corporate governance is 
related to the composition and actions of the board 
of directors to a great extent. Therefore, the broad of 
directors is chosen to be the subject of evaluation. 
However, the modern corporate governance is usually 
conducted by several parts. As a result, the choice of the 
subject of evaluation can directly cause the unicity and 
one-sidedness of the content for evaluation, which causes 
the partiality of the results of evaluation. At present, in 
the popular corporate governance evaluation system, the 
subjects mostly are made up of several parts such as broad 
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of directors, general meeting of shareholders, board of 
supervisors, management and so on. To choose subject of 
evaluation in this way takes the multilateral governance 
into consideration, but almost all of its subjects of 
evaluation come from the stakeholders (especially the 
shareholders) from the internal corporate and even no 
consideration is given to other main stakeholders who 
take part in the corporate governance. Therefore, the 
present choice of the subject of evaluation still views from 
the internal corporate, which cannot meet demands of all 
parts. It is generally acknowledged that different subjects 
of evaluation have different views, demands and contents 
for evaluation. But the present quantitative evaluation of 
corporate governance does not clearly make the subject of 
evaluation . Thus, the results of evaluation may cause the 
wrong decision of other subjects.
b) Missing some key indexes, especially neglecting 
the index of stakeholders. We can see from Table 1 that in 
most evaluation index systems of corporate governance, 
the evaluation index of the first grade does not set the 
evaluation index to the stakeholders. In the main evaluation 
systems abroad, the evaluation system of corporate 
governance of Standard ﹠ Poor’ s involves in this content, 
but it only pays attention to the right of the financial 
stakeholders. In the main domestic evaluation systems, only 
the evaluation index system of corporate governance which 
was put forward by CCGINK involves the evaluation 
of stakeholders in the first grade, but the specific index 
does not contain the evaluation on the benefit safeguard 
of workers and so on. Its essential reason is that there are 
divergences on corporate governance in the academic 
circle, which causes that there is no agreement on the issue 
that whether the attention and security should be given to 
the benefits of other stakeholders besides shareholders. 
Therefore, in the present index system, the key evaluation 
indexes such as stakeholders could lead to partial evaluation 
and false results. So, in the evaluation system of corporate 
governance, it is necessary to set multilevel index which 
specially aims at the stakeholders and this index should be 
one of the key evaluation indexes. The five principles of 
corporate governance that were put forward by OECD the 
Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) pointed out 
the functions of stakeholders on the corporate governance 
and advocated that all the shareholders should be treated 
equally; in Statement of Corporate Governance in US 
Round Table Business Meeting (1997) , the stakeholders 
were also put in important positions. It pointed out that 
in order to protect the long-term benefits of shareholders 
and the normal function of the corporation, the managers 
and board of directors must take the benefits of other 
stakeholders into consideration and the corporate had 
the responsibilities to treat employees equally. Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China 
(2002) which was formulated by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission had special provision on 
the security of the legal interests of stakeholders and 
defined the range of the stakeholders mainly as creditors, 
employees, suppliers, consumers, community and so on. 
Besides, the contributors (mainly are shareholders and 
creditors) had decisive effects on whether the corporate 
had the qualification to be legal corporation and operating 
conditions or not, but the operation and development of 
the corporation could be realized by the joint cooperation 
of managers, workers, clients and other stakeholders. The 
corporation that ignores the benefit of stakeholders must be 
temporary.
c) Lacking objective measure on the importance of 
these indexes causes that the weights of these indexes 
are not scientific. In practice, the evaluation of listed 
corporate governance is made by using the evaluation 
system of corporate governance and results are usually 
expressed with the corporate governance index. Different 
indexes have different significance in the evaluation 
system of corporate governance. So the significance 
of these indexes is mostly measured by the weight 
coefficient. However, in most evaluation systems of 
corporate governance, there are no relative explanation 
to the weight given by the related factors and no analysis 
and illustration on the relationship and degree of related 
factors. Obviously, almost all the evaluation documents 
adopt to assign subjectively or use the score model. 
Although it is convenient, there are important flaws. There 
is no document which measures the objective significance 
of these indexes. Only by clarifying the impact of every 
relative factor on the corporate governance and employing 
objective empowerment, can the weight of every index be 
given correctly and be scored. Therefore, the accuracy of 
the result of the present index system is doubtful.
d) There is no evaluation on the effect of governance, 
which could not bring the external form and internal 
essence of the corporate governance together. The 
quantitative evaluation of corporate governance can be 
shown externally and internally. The ownership structure 
of the corporate, management structure, the structure 
of the board of directors and so on belongs to external 
form, and most documents tend to evaluate externally. 
The effect of governance is the real level of governance, 
which belongs to internal essence that is ignored by 
the present documents. The external form and internal 
essence may be united and deviating. In other words, the 
corporate that have good external form may do not get 
great effect of corporate governance. Since there is not a 
best corporate governance model that is suitable for all 
companies, different corporate governance models have 
different effects. Only if the results are satisfactory, it can 
be considered that the level of corporate governance can 
meet the demands of stakeholders despite that some key 
factors do not totally obey the external standard of the 
evaluation of corporate governance. Therefore, the present 
documents only evaluate the corporate governance of the 
external form or management structure. The authenticity 
and reliability of its results are poor.
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4. ADVICE FOR IMPROVING PRESENT 
RESEARCHES ON THE QUANTITATIVE 
E V A L U A T I O N  O F  C O R P O R A T E 
GOVERNANCE
a) To make the subject of evaluation clear. Based on the 
understanding of corporate governance and its connotation 
of evaluation, through analysis, the thesis holds that the 
evaluation of corporate governance should be based on 
many stakeholders. The results of evaluation of corporate 
governance should not only be applied to the practical 
corporate governance. What is more important is to make 
the benefit and its security situation of every stakeholders 
clear, especially that the outside investors can provide 
practical help to make investment decisions based on 
this. Only by regarding the multi-stakeholders as a whole 
and giving consideration and evaluation from their 
perspectives, can the evaluation results be accepted by 
more people. In other words, the results cannot be more 
objective and fairer unless the company is in the multi-
stakeholders’ positions to balance their interest. Therefore, 
the subject of the corporate governance evaluation is the 
key community of stakeholders in the company, based on 
which corporate governance evaluation index system is 
established to make quantitative evaluation of the listed 
company. The result should be used not only within the 
company but also by relative organizations like external 
investors and even government departments.
Furthermore, if the corporate governance evaluation 
is only carried out for China’s listed companies, external 
governance environments such as whether the relevant 
laws and regulations are sound or not and if government 
regulations are strict should not be evaluated for they are 
the same. Therefore, the internal governance structure and 
governance effect should be evaluated as the focal point. It 
should be noted that a country’s enterprises will have higher 
corporate governance ratings, shown by a large number of 
studies, when it has a strict law on shareholder protection 
and a sound legal environment. Consequently, the sound 
external laws and regulations and the strict enforcement of 
them are of great importance for corporate governance.
b) Investigating the comprehensive evaluation system 
of corporate governance and focusing on key indexes 
at the same time. It is considered in this thesis that the 
evaluation index about relative stakeholders should 
be set in the corporate governance evaluation system. 
Specific consideration should be given to the following 
two aspects. First, the governance structure of listed 
companies in China is usually corporate governance 
structure which is the core of corporate governance 
including general meeting of shareholders, board of 
directors, board of supervisors and management. They 
should, therefore, be individually assessed in terms of 
their performance of duties and governance effectiveness 
in corporate governance practices. Second, to definite 
stakeholders reasonably. A company’s stakeholders 
could have no limitation but apparently not all of them 
can serve as main governors to directly participate 
in corporate governance. So, the advice in this thesis 
is that the range of stakeholders in the evaluation of 
corporate governance could be defined as directly relevant 
stakeholders and major non-social stakeholders including 
shareholders, business operators, creditors, employees 
and the community (including natural environment). 
We can learn from the analysis above that the specific 
index of stakeholders in the evaluation system of 
corporate governance should focus on employees and 
the community (mainly environmental protection and 
other aspects of social responsibility performance). It 
is advised that in terms of specific index setting, the 
evaluation should be made from three aspects as follows: 
employee involvement and protection of their interests, 
the environmental protection behavior and the fulfillment 
of other social responsibilities of enterprises (such as 
quality of products and price monopoly) The most 
important thing is the evaluation of each stakeholder’s 
fulfillment of their responsibilities and protection of 
their interests that they deserve to have. It should be paid 
close attention in particular whether the interests of other 
enterprise stakeholders like employees and creditors are 
misappropriated when shareholders get their own profits.
c) Determining the index weights in a scientific 
way by empirical analysis or measurement of the role 
and importance of the related factors. We believe that 
considering the importance of corporate governance 
evaluation, it should be substantively measured by 
relative experts or agencies organized by the Ministry of 
Finance to provide a reference standard for the majority 
of enterprises when determining the weights of corporate 
governance index. For those companies’ rich in data, they 
may also determine the weight with objective weighting 
method. While the companies which are good at research 
may also use the dynamic simulation of the corporate 
governance system of artificial intelligence such as system 
simulation technology and artificial neural networks to 
measure the specific relevant factors.
d) The index should be determined on the principle 
of combining the essence and form. And the essence of 
corporate governance evaluation should be paid more 
attention. The evaluation of governing effect can be added 
when setting the evaluation index system of corporate 
governance to effectively combine the form and substance 
of company management. For example, we can use many 
ways like anonymous questionnaires and chatting face to 
face to investigate whether there is the largest shareholder 
completely dominating the decision-making powers 
against the combination of form and essence of the major 
decision-making behavior and whether the rights and 
obligations of other shareholders or stakeholders are truly 
implemented. The effect index of corporate governance 
can be expanded with: real rights and obligations of 
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stakeholders in the company, status and role of each 
position when making important decisions, the sustainable 
development capacity of the company, corporate value 
and so on.
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